Barbara Smith v. Lyman S. Shreeve : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1976
Barbara Smith v. Lyman S. Shreeve : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
S. Rex Lewis; Howard, Lewis, and Petersen; Attorneys for Appellant.
David E. West; Armstrong, Rawlings, West, and Schaerrer; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Smith v. Shreeve, No. 14410.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/270
IN THE SUPREME COURT 




BRIGm VOUMG U;..V£RSJTY 
J. Reuben C;:.; Lv: School 
BARBARA SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LYMAN S. SHREEVE, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case No. 14,410 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE 
JURY VERDICT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE MAURICE HARDING, JUDGE 
DAVID E. WEST, for: 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST & 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
SCHAERRER 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellant 
APR 21 1b/b 
Clor!:, Supremo Court. Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 8 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
POINT II 13 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
FAILING TO INSTRUCT THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
CONCLUSION 14 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cohn vs. J. C. Penney Company, 537 P.2d 9,11 
306 (Utah 1975) 
Jorgensen vs. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 9 
383 P.2d 934 
Langton vs. International Transport, Inc. 9,11 
26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 
Lish vs. Utah Power and Light Company 9,11 
27 Utah 2d 90, 493 P.2d 611 
Paul vs. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 13 
261 P.2d 670 
Schneider vs. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35 13 
327 P.2d 822 
Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 












Case No. 14410 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL 
*** 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising from 
an automobile accident which occurred at an intersection in 
Provo, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff and awarded total damages in the 
amount of $2,000.00. Plaintiff's subsequent motion for a 
new trial was denied by the trial court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant in this case seeks to have the case remanded 
for a new trial. Respondent seeks to have the judgment of 
the lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As stated in the brief of appellant, this accident 
occurred on December 5, 1971, at the intersection of 3230 
North and 650 East Street in Provo, Utah. This was a resi-
dential area with both intersecting streets being designed 
for one lane of traffic in each direction. The intersection 
was an open intersection with no traffic control devices or 
stop signs. The accident occurred on a clear Sunday morning 
although the roads were snowpacked from a prior snowstorm. 
At the time of the accident, plaintiff, a 17 year old high 
school student and her girlfriend, were driving around the 
area visiting friends (P-139). They entered the intersection 
headed East, intending to make a left turn to the North. De-
fendant, a language professor at BYU and his wife, were on 
their way home from church traveling South (T-166). They were 
unable to stop for the car making a left turn in front of 
them and a collision occurred (T-169,170). The accident 
occurred approximately in the matter as shown on the following 
* This accident occurred prior to the effective date of the 
Comparative Negligence Act and was tried under the principals 
of Contributory Negligence. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Although there were several details to the accident 
that were in dispute, there was no serious controversy 
concerning many of the material facts. The actual colli-
sion did not occur within the intersection but either nine-
teen or thirty feet North thereof (the investigating officer 
testified at the trial that the point of impact was thirty 
feet North of the intersection, although his notes made out 
at the time of the accident showed it as being nineteen feet 
North of the intersection) (See T-18,19,30,44,53, Exhibits 
D-ll and D-12). The plaintiff's vehicle was still on an 
angle of approximately 45° at the time of impact (T-17). 
The impact to plaintiff's vehicle was near the left front 
door (Exhibit D-8). The impact to defendant's vehicle was 
at the left front corner (T-34, Exhibit P-2,D-19). Defendant's 
vehicle was traveling straight South at the time of impact 
(T-170,186). Expert testimony at trial established without 
contradiction that the impact speed was very low (within the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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range of 8 to 13 miles per hour) and that the relative speed 
of defendant's vehicle was faster than that of the plaintiff's 
(T-201,203). 
A disputed fact at trial involved the question as to 
whether the point of impact occurred on the East or West por-
tion of the road, that is whether the defendant was driving 
left of the center of the roadway. The only evidence that 
defendant may have been over the center line was the testimony 
of Officer Tidwell, the investigating officer, who testified 
to that effect (T-21). Officer Tidwell also testified how-
ever, that at the time of impact plaintiff's automobile was 
on a 45° angle and that the back of her vehicle had not yet 
crossed over the center line and was in the defendant's lane 
(T-17,21). Thus, if the officer was correct in his opinion 
as to the point of impact, such would have occurred just 
slightly over the center line, as the impact to the plaintiff's 
vehicle was at the front door, the car is on a 45° angle, and 
the back of her car was in defendant's lane. The testimony 
of the investigating officer on this issue was further emas-
culated by the fact that he never actually measured the width 
of the road at the place of impact. His measurements were 
taken at a point South of the intersection where he acknow-
ledged that the road was narrower and not even the same width 
as where the accident occurred (T-33,34). Also the roads 
were covered with snow and no determination was made of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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width of the actual travel portion of the road. Both defen-
dant and his wife testified that they were traveling on their 
own side of the road (T-168,185). Defendant's expert witness 
also testified in his opinion that the defendant's vehicle 
was further to the West and clearly within his own lane of 
travel; this testimony was based upon the fact that the cen-
ter of the road was melting and the sides still snowpacked, 
and that in order to skid straight forward as was the testi-
mony of all witnesses that all four wheels would have had to 
been on a surface with the same coefficiency of friction 
(T-210,215). There was no evidence whatsoever introduced 
at the trial which would show that plaintiff at all times 
did not have sufficient road width on her side of the street 
to safely bypass any oncoming traffic. 
Another disputed fact was whether the plaintiff made 
an improper turn in cutting the corner. Plaintiff and her 
passenger both claim to have made a proper turn. Defendant 
and his passenger both testify that the corner was cut (T-169, 
182,186,187). As documented above, however, the physical 
evidence showed that plaintiff's car was still on a 45° angle 
at the time of impact, that the impact occurred either nine-
teen or thirty feet beyond the intersection, and that the 
back of plaintiff's car at such point was still in defendant's 
-5-
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lane of travel. 
A final material fact in issue involved the plaintiff's 
lookout. She testified in her deposition that she did not 
see the defendant's vehicle until she had made her turn and 
passed all the way through the intersection (T-143-145). At 
trials she changed her testimony somewhat and attempted to 
move back the point at which she first saw the defendant (T-122). 
However, on cross examination she acknowledged that when she 
first saw defendant's vehicle she traveled one car length 
before impact (T-146); that she didn't have time to even apply 
her brakes (T-146); that she didn't have time to attempt to 
turn in either direction (T-147); and that she was beyond the 
point where the accident could have been avoided (T-147). She 
further testified that as she approached the intersection she 
looked in both directions and did not see defendant's vehicle 
(although it was there plainly to be seen)(T-120,121,145). 
She attempted to excuse her failure to keep a proper lookout 
by claiming that her vision was blocked by a fence and a parked 
car (T-140,141); however, the pictures introduced at trial 
clearly show that the fence didn't block her vision (see wood 
fence shown at extreme left in Exhibit P-3); and to claim that 
a parked car excuses being unable to see what is beyond it 
is rather incredible. 
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Based upon the evidence establishing improper lookout 
and the physical evidence showing that plaintiff made an 
improper left turn, defendant made a motion for nonsuit 
claiming that reasonable minds could do nothing other than 
find negligence on the part of the plaintiff and that she 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law (T-164). 
The court reserved its ruling on defendant's motion (T-164) 
apparently prefering that the case be submitted to the jury. 
The motion was never ruled upon. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the case was argued 
and submitted to the jury. During the course of its delib-
erations the jury asked that a handwritten note be delivered 
to the judge. The note from the jury to the judge stated as 
follows: 
"We find that both parties were contributorily 
negligent but may we award punitive damages to 
the plaintiff? (R-4). 
The note was discussed in chambers with counsel after which 
the court wrote a reply on the note as follows: 
"No. See Instructions Nos. 4 and 5" (R-4). 
Although the jury had made a finding of contributory 
negligence it nevertheless returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff awarding no special damages and $2,000.00 general dam-
ages (R-31). No request was made by either counsel to have 
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the jury correct what appeared on its face to be an irreg-
ular verdict, and the juror was thereupon discharged by the 
court (T-254). At a later date counsel for the plaintiff 
filed a motion for new trial with the trial court supported 
by his Memorandum of Authorities (R-22,23). The motion also 
sought in the alternative the granting of an additur. The 
motion for new trial was considered by the trial court and 
denied (R-19). Plaintiff then appealed to this court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
It is rather obvious from the facts of this case that 
if the verdict of the jury was influenced by sympathy, preju-
dice or passion it worked in favor of the plaintiff and not 
against her. After making a determination that plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent the jury still awarded plaintiff 
$2,000.00 in damages, when in fact the judgment should have 
been for "No cause of action". Likewise if there was any 
error in law it operated in favor of the plaintiff as she 
shouldn't have been entitled to any judgment at all. While 
the verdict itself was irregular on its face in not awarding 
special damages, the law is clear that any such irregularity 
-8-
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is waived by not asking that it be corrected before the 
jury is discharged. Cohn vs. J. C. Penney Company, (Utah 
1975) 537 P.2d 306; Langton vs. International Transport, 
Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211; Lish vs. Utah Power 
and Light Company, 27 Utah 2d 90, 493 P.2d 611; Jorgensen 
vs. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934; Rule 47(r)Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Langton vs. International Transport, Inc., supra, 
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in a personal 
injury action and awarded special damages and property dam-
ages but no general damages. The plaintiff thereafter made 
a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) (5), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, claiming inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice. 
The court pointed out the distinction between a verdict that 
is irregular or defective and one that is regular on its 
face, but which merely awards insufficient damages; holding 
that a verdict which failed to include all of the items of 
damages was one that is defective in form. In such case the 
court emphasized the need to have the jury correct the defect 
under proper instructions from the court. The court quoted 
from the California case of Brown vs. Regan and stated as 
follows: 
"The proper procedure where an informal or 
insufficient verdict has been returned is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for the trial court to require the ver-
dict to return for further deliberation. 
. . • It is well established by numerous 
authorities that, when a verdict is not 
in the proper form and the jury is not 
required to clarify it, any error in said 
verdict is waived by the party relying 
thereon who at the time of its rendition 
failed to make any request that its in-
formality or uncertainty be corrected." 
In explaining the reason why there is a waiver unless timely 
objection is made the court in its opinion further stated 
as follows: 
"If counsel be permitted to remain mute 
when a verdict is insufficient or informal, 
he gains an unfair strategic advantage, 
which the instant case clearly illustrates. 
The evidence of defendant's negligence was 
weak; the issue of whether the asserted 
negligence of defendant was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries was weaker. 
The evidence of plaintiff's contributory 
negligence was considerable. It would 
be most advantageous to plaintiff to be 
granted a new trial, particularly if it 
were limited to the issue of damages. 
In either event, he would have an oppor-
tunity to present his case to a new jury. 
On the other hand, if the court had sent 
the jury out for further deliberation, 
with additional instructions setting forth 
clearly that the law does not permit the 
jury to compromise liability and that 
under the facts of the case the plaintiff, 
if entitled to special damages, must also 
receive compensation for his pain and 
suffering and lost wages, there was a 
real possibility that the verdict might 
have been in favor of the defendant. 
The silence of plaintiff's counsel, upon 
hearing the verdict, is comprehensible, 
-10-
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he could reasonably have concluded that the 
jury was unsympathetic to his cause or 
parsimonious, and he would, of course, pre-
fer a new jury. There must be reasonable 
rules to control the termination of liti-
gation, if counsel has an opportunity to 
correct error at the time of its occurrence 
and he fails to do so, any objection based 
thereupon is waived.11 
The Langton Case was later followed in the case of 
Lish vs. Utah Power and Light Company, supra, wherein the 
court held as follows: 
"(Plaintiff) contends that there is an irreg-
ularity in the verdict as finally rendered. 
However, he permitted the jury to be excused 
without requesting any clarification of the 
verdict and so cannot properly expect this 
court to do what could have been done by 
the jury before it was discharged." 
Cohn vs. J. C. Penney Company, supra, was another case 
in which the jury awarded special damages and loss of income 
but failed to make award of general damages. In citing the 
Langton Case as authority this court again held as follows: 
"In the instant matter there was not merely 
an inadequate award of general damages— 
there was no award at all. The verdict 
was deficient in form, and counsel had an 
opportunity to have the jury sent back for 
further deliberations. This he did not 
do, perhaps fearing that the jury might 
either award some nominal amount or even 
change the verdict and award nothing to 
the plaintiff. It would be a smart trial 
tactic if he could have had a new trial 
on damages only before a jury which 
would not be acquainted with the weakness 
of plaintiff's cause of action. 
We think the Langton case disposes of 
the present matter." 
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In the instant case the reason for counselfs failure 
to ask that the verdict be corrected is obvious. He knew 
that the jury had made a determination of contributory neg-
ligence and feared that if the jury be asked to correct the 
judgment by giving them additional instructions to the effect 
that they are not permitted to compromise liability, that 
the most likely result would be a verdict of no cause of 
action. He thereupon allowed the jury to be discharged be-
fore making any objections as to the irregularity of the 
verdict, hoping that he could get another day in court. This 
is the very thing that the law of the cited cases is designed 
to prevent. 
Plaintifffs argument that she had no opportunity to 
object to the irregularity of the verdict is absolutely with-
out merit. There is nothing in the record to show that 
counsel was deprived of his opportunity to object. After 
the verdict was read the jury was polled (T-253). The judge 
then thanked the jury for its services (T-254). Then a 
discussion was held off the record (T-254) before the jury 
left the courtroom. Counsel had plenty of opportunity to 
request that the verdict be corrected and he simply chose 
to remain silent. 
This court has further announced the principal time 
and time again to a large extent the granting or denying 
-1 9-
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of a motion for new trial rests within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court and will not be interfered with 
unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. 
Paul vs. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, The trial • 
judge heard plaintiff1s moti on for a new tr I al. He, of 
course, was present throughout the entire trial and did 
not feel that there was anything about the jury verdict 
that would justify the granting of a new trial. It was 
stated in Schneider vs. Suhrmann* * ':ta- 2d 35, 327 P. 2d 822 
that "The r efusal of the trial cc-.r- •_ . . odify the verdict 
endows it with some further degree of sanctity which increases 
our hesitancy in disturbing it upon review", The above 
authorities would compel an affirmance of the judgment of 
the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO 
INSTRUCT THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In Point II of appellant's brief she urges that the 
court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct 
that defendant vas neg] igent as a matter of .1 aw Respondent 
strongly disagrees that such would have been a proper instruc-
tion, the issue :;f plaintiff's negligence being a proper 
jury questio. ; lowever, in any event, it is obvious that the 
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jury found that the defendant was negligent so that the 
failure to give such instruction could not possibly have 
been prejudicial. The handwritten note given to the judge 
by the jury stated that it had found negligence on the part 
of both plaintiff and defendant. Thereafter the court's 
instructions were not followed and a verdict returned for 
the plaintiff. Thus regardless of the verdict they found, 
or the one they should have found, they would have had to 
conclude that defendant was negligent. The more important 
issue in this case was plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
The facts establishing contributory negligence are carefully 
documented under the Statement of Facts in this brief, and 
would support a finding of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. Defendant's motion for nonsuit, which was 
never ruled upon, should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
If anyone in this case is entitled to a new trial it 
is defendant and not plaintiff. Defendant is not entirely 
happy about the verdict as it should have been for no cause 
of action. Defendant, however, is not seeking a new trial 
and is willing to accept the judgment in the interests of 
bringing the litigation to a close. This accident occurred 
in the year 1971 and now almost five years later the litiga-
tion is still continuing. The parties have had their day 
_1 A_ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in court. A very capable trial judge has reviewed the 
2 a s e a n d f o u n d n o g r o u n d s f o i a i 1 e w t r i a ] 11 i s t i m e 
that this litigation be brought to an end. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney ~-r 3esc;.:-.dent 
-15-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
